Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591; (2000) 169 ALR 616; (2000) 74 ALJR 604; (2000) 21(5) Leg Rep 2; (2000) ATPR 41-757;[2000] HCA 11

Gleeson CJ and McHugh J

[13] It has been established for more than 20 years that s80 means what it says. In Phelps v Western Mining Corp Ltd8 the Full Court of the Federal Court rejected an argument that the words “any other person” in s80 should be read down as meaning that only persons who are affected by a contravention of PtV could seek relief under s80. Deane J said9:

As a matter of ordinary language, the phrase ‘any other person’ connotes any other person whatsoever. The context in which the phrase appears in s80 … does not, upon analysis, suggest, let alone justify, the conclusion that the Legislature intended that the phrase be modified by the engrafting of speculative qualifications such as ‘who is a consumer’ or ‘who is a competitor’ or ‘who has an interest of a type which would give him standing to institute common law civil proceedings if the conduct complained of were tortious’.

[14] Bowen CJ pointed out10 that what was at issue was a question of standing, not a question as to the considerations which might, in a particular case, bear upon whether it was appropriate to grant any, and if so what, relief. He adverted to the problems, as to relief, that could arise in the case of a suit commenced by an officious bystander, but declined to accept, in relation to legislation protective of the public interest, that the solution to those problems was to be found in giving a narrow and artificial interpretation to the statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction and standing.

[15] The word “any” does not lend itself to a restrictive interpretation.

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